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which addressed a creditor’s knowledge of alleged breaches of fiduciary duties by officers and
directors.
When considering the knowledge of the debtor in the context of a statute of limitations
analysis, the statute will begin to run when the plaintiff discovers, or by “reasonable diligence
should have discovered his injury.”4 The Third Circuit set forth a three-step analytical
framework to scrutinize whether a party is under inquiry notice.5 The analysis includes the “(1)
precise nature of the claims now being asserted, (2) whether an objectively reasonable person
would have realized the need to investigate further, and (3) what information such an inquiry
would have disclosed.”6 If a Plaintiff is not under inquiry notice and has no knowledge of the
claim during the applicable statute of limitations, tolling mechanisms may apply.7
In In re AMC Investors, the Delaware district court reversed the bankruptcy court’s
decision granting summary judgment in favor of the officers and directors (the “Defendants”) of
AMC (the “Company”) because Eugenia, as the sole creditor, was granted derivative standing to
file suit on behalf of the debtors of the Company.8 Prior to being granted derivative standing,
Eugenia filed involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petitions against the debtors, in which orders for
relief under Chapter 7 were entered in 2009.9 In 2011, Eugenia was granted derivative standing
to sue on behalf of the debtors and brought a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against the
Company in the Delaware bankruptcy court.10

4

Pomeranz v. Museum Partners, L.P., 2005 WL 217039, at *3 (Del. Ch. Jan. 24, 2005).
EBS Litig. LLC v. Barclays Glob. Inv'rs, N.A., 304 F.3d 302, 305 (3d Cir. 2002).
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
See In re AMC Inv’rs, LLC, 551 B.R. 148, 151 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016).
9
See id.
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See id.
5
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In 2015, the bankruptcy court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants,
which was based on the Defendants’ statute of limitation defense.11 The bankruptcy court held
that Eugenia’s claim was time-barred because Eugenia knew about Defendants’ conduct in
2005.12 Eugenia and the debtors (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”) appealed summary judgment.13
The Delaware district court, in reversing the bankruptcy court’s decision, pointed out that the
bankruptcy court’s “… determination that none of Delaware’s tolling doctrines are available to
Debtors was incorrect based solely on Eugenia’s knowledge.”14 Thus, the district court held that
a creditor’s knowledge of alleged breaches of fiduciary duties should not be imputed upon
debtors in a statute of limitations analysis.15
This memorandum will explore the district court’s holding and its implications in light of
the appeal filed by the Defendants to the Third Circuit on July 26, 2016. Part I of this memo will
discuss the statute of limitations analysis set forth by both the bankruptcy court and the district
court. Part II will discuss the statute of limitations analysis under New York law. Part III will
discuss the larger implications of these differing statute of limitations’ analyses regarding section
541 claims as well as the appeal to the Third Circuit and the current status of this case.
I.

The Differing Analyses of the Delaware Courts
A.

The Delaware Bankruptcy Court’s Analysis

In 2011, Eugenia was granted derivative standing to sue on behalf of the debtors and
brought a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against the officers, directors, and/or shareholders of

11

See id. at 152.
See Eugenia VI Venture Holdings Ltd. V. Maplewood Holdings LLC (In re AMC Investors,
LLC), 524 B.R. 62, 80-81 (Bankr. D. Del. 2015).
13
See AMC, 551 B.R. at 153.
14
Id. at 155.
15
See id.
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the Company in the Delaware bankruptcy court.16 The bankruptcy court noted that a court sitting
in equity is not bound by a legal statute of limitations under Delaware law.17 Nevertheless,
because equity follows the law, certain circumstances call for the court to apply a statute of
limitations through analogy.18 The bankruptcy court reasoned that a statute of limitations
analysis was appropriate because alleged breaches of fiduciary duty are equitable claims that
bear “a close resemblance” to legal claims.19 Under Delaware law, breach of fiduciary duty
claims have a three-year statute of limitations.20 The statute of limitations period begins to run
from the date of the alleged harm.21
Plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claims derive from the Defendants’ alleged
mismanagement of the Company from 2003 to 2005.22 The bankruptcy court then reasoned that
Plaintiff’s claims would be time-barred unless Plaintiff could establish a basis for tolling the
statute of limitations.23 The three bases for tolling the statute of limitations under Delaware law
are: “(1) inherently unknowable injuries, (2) fraudulent concealment, and (3) equitable tolling
following a breach of fiduciary duties.”24 The statute of limitations will begin to accrue “upon
the discovery of facts constituting the basis of the cause of action or the existence of facts
sufficient to put a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence on inquiry which, if pursued,
would lead to a discovery of such facts.”25
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See id. at 150.
See AMC, 524 B.R at 80.
18
See In re Lyn, 483 B.R. 440, 452 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012).
19
See Vichi v. Koninklijke Philips Elec. N. V., 2009 WL 4345724, at *16 (Del.Ch. Dec. 1, 2009).
20
10 Del.C. § 8106.
21
Bren v. Capital Realty Grp. Senior Hous. Inc. 2004 WL 370214 (Del. Ch. 2004).
22
See AMC, 524 B.R. at 80.
23
See id.
24
See id. at 81.
25
Vichi, 2009 WL 4345724, at *17.
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The bankruptcy court cited Bren v. Capital Realty Grp. Senior House, Inc., in which the
Chancery Court determined that the statute of limitations could not be tolled merely because of a
plaintiff’s lack of standing.26 Ultimately, the bankruptcy court held that Eugenia’s knowledge
would be imputed to the debtors and, because Eugenia knew about the Defendants’ alleged
breach in June 2005, the statute of limitations would not be tolled.27 Accordingly, the
bankruptcy court found that the Plaintiffs’ claim was time-barred and granted summary judgment
in favor of the Defendants.28
B.

The Delaware District Court’s Analysis

On appeal, the Delaware district court concluded that Eugenia’s knowledge of the
Defendants’ alleged breach could not be imputed upon the debtors.29 Principally, the Plaintiff’s
argued that the bankruptcy court did not explain its reasoning as to why Eugenia’s knowledge
should be imputed to the debtors.30 Further, Plaintiff maintained that a statute of limitations does
not run for a corporate entity, such as the Debtors, under Delaware law “until at least one
innocent party has knowledge of the facts constituting the cause of action and obtains standing to
sue on its behalf.”31 Notably, during the statute of limitations period, Eugenia did not have
standing to allege the breach of fiduciary duty claims against Defendants.32 The Defendants
disputed Plaintiff’s claim by arguing that any potential tolling of the statute of limitations would
cease once a plaintiff, who may derivatively sue for the debtors, became aware of the breach.33
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Bren, 2004 WL 370214, at *4.
See AMC, 524 B.R. at 81.
28
See id.
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AMC, 551 B.R. at 155.
30
See id. at 153.
31
Id.
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AMC, 524 B.R. at 80.
33
See AMC, 551 B.R. at 153.
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Because Eugenia became aware of the potential breach in 2005, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s
claim should be barred as untimely.34
The district court’s analysis began by noting that the bankruptcy court applied the proper
standards for a statute of limitations analysis for a court sitting in equity.35 However, the district
court held that the bankruptcy court erred in its statute of limitations analysis, in that its inquiry
should not have been based on Eugenia’s knowledge.36 Because the Debtors are the true
plaintiffs who have a valid claim for breach of fiduciary duty against the defendants, “the
relevant inquiry turns on a plaintiff’s ability to discover the claim.”37 Regarding the Debtors’
ability to toll the statute of limitations, the district court relied on Kahn v. Seaboard Corporation,
where the court stated “reasonable reliance upon the competence and good faith of others who
have assumed legal responsibilities towards a plaintiff have not infrequently been held sufficient
to toll the running of an applicable statute of limitations.”38 Ultimately, the court found that
Eugenia’s knowledge should not have been imputed to the Debtors for purposes of determining
whether any of the tolling doctrines were available to the Debtors.39
II.

Statute of Limitations Analysis Under New York Law
The procedural posture of AMC shows that both parties agreed with the three bases for

tolling the statute of limitations followed under Delaware law, i.e., (1) inherently unknowable
injuries, (2) fraudulent concealment, and (3) equitable tolling following a breach of fiduciary
duties.40 The conflict between these adversaries derived from the question of whether Eugenia’s

34

See id.
AMC, 551 B.R. at 154.
36
See id. at 155.
37
See id.
38
625 A.2d 269, 275 (Del.Ch. 1993).
39
See id.
40
See AMC, 524 B.R. at 81.
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knowledge, as a lender to the Company, should be imputed to the Debtors of the Company.
Under Delaware law, the applicability of any tolling doctrine depends upon a plaintiff’s ability to
discover or perceive the alleged harm.41 As outlined by the Delaware district court, because the
Debtors solely have a viable claim against the Defendants, the applicability of any tolling
doctrine will depend upon the Debtors knowledge of the alleged breach of fiduciary duty.42
Nevertheless, the facts of AMC may cause an alternate outcome in different jurisdictions.
For example, akin to Delaware law, New York law recognizes breach of fiduciary duty
claims as claims in equity. Under New York law, section 213(7) of the New York Civil Practice
Law and Rules (“CPLR”) would be applicable under the AMC facts. For non-derivative breach
of fiduciary duty claims, CPLR § 213(1) and CPLR § 214(3) are the germane sections of the
CPLR, and the applicability of these sections depends upon the relief being sought. However,
because Eugenia brought it as a derivative claim, CPLR § 213(7) applies. CPLR § 213(7) states,
an action must be brought within six years that is “… by or on behalf of a corporation against a
present or former director, officer or stockholder for an accounting, or to procure a judgment on
the ground of fraud, or to enforce a liability, penalty or forfeiture, or to recover damages for
waste or for an injury to property or for an accounting in conjunction therewith.”43
As with Delaware law, which depends upon the amount of time that has passed, under
New York law a plaintiff’s derivative claims could be time-barred, as breach of fiduciary claims
accrue upon the date of the breach.44 However, a claim for breach of fiduciary duty is tolled as
long as the fiduciary relationship persists.45 A breach of fiduciary duty claim does not accrue
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See AMC, 551 B.R. at 155.
See id.
43
CPLR § 213(7).
44
See CPLR § 213(7).
45
See St. John's Univ., N.Y. v. Bolton, 757 F. Supp. 2d 144, 169 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
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until “until the fiduciary has openly repudiated his or her obligation or the relationship has been
otherwise terminated.”46 Considering the same facts as in the AMC case, the Company became
insolvent in 2005 and the board of directors voted to end operations, the fiduciary relationship
between the Company and the Debtors ceased in 2005.47 Akin to Delaware law regarding tolling
a limitations statute, if a plaintiff possesses relevant knowledge that would place the plaintiff
under the duty to inquire further into a potential breach of fiduciary duty, the statute of
limitations will not be tolled.48
The facts of the AMC case applied under either New York law or Delaware law would
yield a similar result. Because Eugenia originally brought suit in the Southern District of New
York in 2005, it is clear that they had the requisite knowledge regarding the alleged claims for
breach of fiduciary duty.49 As Eugenia’s claims against the Company were dismissed by
summary judgment, they commenced the present suit on behalf of the Debtors in 2011.50 The
Delaware district court’s analysis, as is applied in New York, places the impetus upon the
Plaintiff to show that 1) they did not have the requisite knowledge of facts that would support a
breach of fiduciary duty and 2) they were not placed on inquiry notice. Because statute of
limitations analyses are analyzed in courts of equity in both Delaware and New York, focusing
on the knowledge of the underlying Plaintiff in a derivative suit is the most just result.
III. Larger Implications & Conclusion
The In re AMC Investors holding affects intricate procedural issues regarding legal
claims brought through section 541 of the Code. A party that brings a claim through section 541

46

Golden Pacific Bancorp v. FDIC, 273 F.3d 509, 518 (2d Cir. 2001).
See AMC, 551 B. R. at 149.
48
Gleason v. Spota, 194 A.D.2d 764, 765 (1993).
49
See AMC, 524 B.R. at 80-81.
50
See AMC, 551 B.R. at 151.
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on behalf of a debtor assumes the debtor’s interest in the claim.51 In other words, a legal claim
brought through section 541 is solely the debtor’s cause of action. Therefore, all relevant tolling
inquiries and statute of limitations’ analyses apply to the debtors and not the creditor acting on
the debtors’ behalf.52 Thus, this holding causes section 541 claims to be analyzed without any
regard to the interests of the party instituting the claim on the debtors’ behalf.
On January 31, 2017, the appeal to the Third Circuit was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction because the district court’s order was not a final order.53 Finality in the prior
proceedings was necessary for the Third Circuit to have jurisdiction to hear this appeal.54
Although the appeal has been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and as of March 19, 2017 no new
documents have been filed, the statute of limitations and imputation of knowledge analyses will
both be dependent upon the Debtors knowledge of any alleged breaches of fiduciary duty by the
officers and directors of the Company.
Under both New York and Delaware law, the relevant inquiry for (1) a statute of
limitations analysis and (2) imputation of knowledge are fact-specific inquiries. The specific
facts of each case will dictate whether the statute of limitations will be tolled or whether the
knowledge of one party in a suit should be imputed to another. Ultimately, the court may find
that the Debtors had knowledge of the alleged breach of fiduciary duty. This knowledge would
cause the claim to be untimely. However, if the Debtors did not have the requisite knowledge of
the claim, the statute of limitations would be tolled and their claim would likely proceed. The
Appellant-Defendants may file another appeal any day, but as of now, this matter is closed.
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R. F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d at 356.
AMC, 551 B.R. at 155.
53
In Re AMC Investors, LLC, et al, 16-3193.
54
See id.
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